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Abstract 
 
Horizontal governance arrangements potentially conflict with the very principles of the 
representative democracy and its political institutions. This conflict manifests itself in the 
interaction between representatives and the executive power: Although the former has the 
formal power to decide upon policies and to check their implementation, the latter participates 
in horizontal networks and therefore has more resources to influence the content, evolvement 
and outcomes of the policy process. This erodes the power position of representatives. 
Framework setting is commonly suggested as an arrangement for representatives to enhance 
their grip on policy processes. The authors of this contribution examine the effects of 
framework setting as coupling mechanism between horizontal networks and vertical politics 
in six policy processes in a Dutch province. Based on network theory and research findings 
they suggest redefining the concept of framework setting in order to make it more attuned to 
the complex, interdependent and dynamic nature of policy-making in networks.  
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Introduction. Horizontal governance in a representative democracy 
 
Both in the public-administration literature and in policy practice, terms like ‘policy 
networks’ and ‘governance’ are in vogue (Hirst, 2000; Hajer et al., 2003; Soerensen and 
Torfing, 2006). They reflect the insight that the processes by which public policy is made and 
is implemented evolve in horizontal settings: complex sets of interactions between mutually 
dependent but relatively autonomous public, private and societal parties. These networks cut 
across existing territorial, administrative and functional boundaries (Castells, 1996; Rhodes, 
1997, 2000; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). Steering in such policy networks is referred 
to as ‘governance’ (Kooiman, 1993; Pierre, 2000).  
 From a democratic point of view, these developments are viewed with concern (Ripley 
and Franklin, 1987; Rosenau, 1995, 2000; Rhodes, 1997, 2000; Marin and Mayntz, 1991). 
Horizontal governance arrangements potentially conflict with the very principles of the 
representative democracy and, likewise, with the existing political institutions. According to 
these principles power within a political community is exercised by elected administrators, 
mandated by the electorate, who publicly account for the way they carry out that mandate to 
the electorate. Power is perceived here as the capacity to take authoritative decisions and to 
ensure their implementation (Dryzek, 2006; Soerensen and Torfing, 2006). 
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 The institutional design of the representative democracy consists of a vertical chain of 
representation, steering and accountability relations between the electors and the elected, the 
representatives and political authorities (administrators) and political authorities and civil 
servants (executive agencies) respectively. Here, political primacy emphasizes the principal-
agent relations between political authorities and civil servants on the one hand and 
representatives and political authorities on the other hand (Strom, 2000; Hupe, 2004; Bovens, 
n.a.).  
 The rise of policy networks and governance weakens this vertical chain of 
representation, steering and accountability relations. As Bovens et al. (1995) pointed out some 
time ago, this leads to ‘the shifting of politics’: key societal decisions are increasingly taken 
outside the influence domain of the vertical steering and accountability relations of 
representative democracy (see also Held, 1995; Thomassen and Schmidt, 1999; Dryzek, 1996; 
Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). In addition to decreased steering possibilities, 
there is an increase in asymmetry in relations between representatives and executive power as 
regards the available information, knowledge, expertise and capacity (Scharpf, 1999). As a 
result, representatives find it difficult to influence the substance and implementation of policy 
(Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000).  
One can conclude that the practices of horizontal governance and vertical politics have 
their own rationale and that their couplings are weak and problematic. The possibilities for 
elected politicians in the ‘vertical chain’ to influence the activities and performance of parties 
involved in horizontal governance processes and to ascertain accountability are limited. And, 
the other way around, for horizontal governance it is hard to generate political support and 
trust and to prevent disturbing interventions from the vertical chain.  
 As an attempt to strengthen the position of representative bodies, recently, the Dutch 
government introduced a dual system in local and provincial politics. In this system 
representatives have got a ‘framework setting role’, which formally implies that ‘the 
representative body lays down beforehand what the aims and the desired societal effects of a 
particular policy should be. The Executive sees to the implementation of the policy within the 
scope of these frameworks’ (Association of Provincial Authorities and Ministry of the 
Interior, 2006). This idea of framework setting builds on notions like ‘management by 
objectives’, ‘performance management’, and ‘frame-legislation’ (Johnson, 1991; Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992; Behn and Kant, 1999; Osborne and Plastrik, 2000; Pollitt, 2003; Bovaird and 
Löffler, 2003; De Bruijn, 2007).    
In this article we examine whether and how ‘framework setting’ helps to improve the 
coupling between horizontal governance and vertical politics by enhancing the ability for 
elected representatives to govern the process of policy making. In the next section we discuss 
three reactions to the problematic coupling between horizontal governance and vertical 
politics and position ‘framework setting’ as a possible solution within this debate. Inspired by 
policy network theory, we identify three challenges that framework setting in networks should 
deal with. Section 2 ends with a detailed explanation of our research question and research 
strategy. Then, in section 3, we report on six case studies into framework setting in the Dutch 
province of North Brabant, in which we examined whether framework setting contributed to 
an improved coupling, by analyzing the way the province face the three challenges. In section 
4, we discuss how framework setting could be adapted in order to meet these challenges. 
Section 5 contains a conclusion. 
 
 
Vertical politics, horizontal governance, and framework setting  
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Both in policy practice and in the public-administration literature, attempts have been made to 
find a solution for the problematic relation between horizontal governance forms and vertical 
institutions of representative democracy.  
 
Three reactions to the problematic coupling 
 
Roughly speaking, three reactions to the problematic coupling between horizontal governance 
and vertical politics can be distinguished. 
 
Reaction I. Restoring political primacy. The first reaction is that of the call for restoring 
political primacy, recapturing the public domain. This reaction comprises on the one hand 
proposals to bridge the gap between electors and the elected by, for instance, changing the 
electoral system or introducing referendums. On the other hand, this reaction involves 
proposals to reverse horizontalization by weeding the forest of horizontal relations, 
streamlining procedures, decreasing the density of administration, halting hiving-off and 
privatization and reversing them where possible (Lazare, 1996; Mulgan, 2000; Van 
Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004).  
 
Reaction II. Democratizing horizontal governance. The second reaction is based on the 
assumption that, in a complex society, horizontal forms of administration are inevitable. The 
aim is then to improve the democratic functioning of these horizontal forms of administration 
(Soerensen and Torfing, 2006). Improvements are sought in: 
 The effectiveness, quality and inclusiveness of the policy performance. Horizontal 
steering arrangements can lead to policy outcomes that take a wider range of societal 
values into account than the results of vertical steering (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; 
Soerensen and Torfing, 2006).  
 Improving the conditions (including transparency, accessibility, representativeness and 
accountability) that influence the quality of policy argumentations and performance in 
horizontal interaction processes within network settings (‘deliberative democracy’) 
(Forester, 1989; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). 
 Developing forms of horizontal accountability such as benchmarking, certification, 
societal reports, self-evaluations, peer-group assessments, assessments by users and 
stakeholders (Hirst, 1994; 2000; Soerensen and Torfing, 2006). 
 
Reaction III  Improving the coupling between vertical democracy and horizontal governance.  
The third reaction assumes the side-by-side existence of horizontal forms of administration 
and the vertical institutions of the representative democracy (Weiss, 1998; Pollit, 2003; Klijn 
and Sketcher, 2007). The key question then is how the coupling between them can be 
improved (cf., Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000).  
 A poor coupling between the two practices may limit or reduce the assets of horizontal 
forms of administration, for example if politicians lay down over-stringent preconditions or if 
their interventions hamper the cooperation between horizontal partners. Poor couplings also 
occur when representatives prove unable to act as countervailing power vis-à-vis 
administrators, civil servants and their horizontal partners. In that case, interference from the 
vertical chain will be unable to correct the democratic imperfections of horizontal governance 
(Przeworski et al., 1999; Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000).  
 Adequate couplings allow representative bodies to steer and to ascertain 
accountability, while providing implementing bodies with the necessary discretionary room, 
resources and mandates to operate effectively in network situations. 
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Framework setting as coupling arrangement  
 
In 2002 and 2003, the dual system was introduced in respectively the Dutch local and 
provincial politics following a change in the Local Government Act and the Provinces Act. In 
the former situation, members of the Executive were part of the Council and tasks and 
responsibilities were not clearly separated. The core of the dualization was the ‘unbundling’ 
of the Council and the Executive.2 This implied that a separation was made in the 
composition, functions and powers of the Council and the Executive (Ministry of the Interior, 
2003). The Executive deals with administration. The Council represents the citizens, sets the 
frameworks within which the Executive operates, and calls it to account for its performance. 
Dualization would enhance the transparency of the administrative relations and strengthen the 
position of the representative body towards the executive board. The introduction of the dual 
system in local and provincial politics may be seen as a reaction to the problematic relation 
between vertical politics and horizontal governance.  
 The solution is sought by clearly separating ‘business-like’ administration from the 
‘political’ activities of steering and monitoring (Scheltema, 1982; Stout, 1994). The 
administration deals with the development and implementation of policy in the administrative 
networks in which other governments, executive agencies, private organizations, interest 
groups, and citizens may participate. The representative body fulfills a ‘framework-setting 
role’ towards the administration (Association of Provincial Authorities and Ministry of the 
Interior, 2006). The Council does not fulfill this role by supervising all the decisions of the 
Executive, since it does not have the expertise and the resources to do so, but by making 
meta-decisions: setting policy objectives, allocating responsibilities and providing broad 
guidelines for behaviour (compare O’Toole, 1988; Grantham, 2001).  
These meta-decisions make up the policy framework, within which boundaries the 
Executive is supposed to operate and that provides the Executive with the necessary 
descretionary freedom to interact with network partners and deal with uncertainties during 
policy implementation. The policy framework also focusses the process by which the Council 
monitors the Executive and calls it to account (Ministry of the Interior, 2003; Association of 
Provincial Authorities and Ministry of the Interior, 2006).  
An important instrument for the representative body for framework setting is the 
development of (framework setting) policy white papers, in which the steering and 
monitoring role of the representative body can be described (Koppenjan et al., 2006: 5).  
Figure 1 visualizes the process of framework setting. The horizontal line represents 
the process of policy making and implementation in which the Executive interacts with the 
other parties of the network. After policy preparation, the Council decides upon the policy 
framework. During policy implementation the Council monitors deviations (policy as 
realized) from the framework (policy as planned) and makes agreements with the Executive 
on adjusting the implementation in order to comply with the framework.   
 
 
                                                 
2 The definitions of the term ‘dual system’ and the implications of the introduction of such a system can differ 
from one country to a next. In this article, we refer to the Dutch situation, where dualization implies a division 
between politics and administration.   
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Figure 1. Framework setting by the PC in Dutch provincial policy making 
Three challenges for framework setting in policy networks 
 
here are reasons to question the feasibility of the ideas on dualization and framework setting. 
rks may 
 to the 
networ licy 
s. 
ic 
omplexity. Policy networks are characterized by complexity due to the number and 
al with. 
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e is 
implementers from making adequate trade-offs between divergent or conflicting policy 
 
 
T
First, information on performance often is not used in decision making processess. 
Furthermore, since frameworks not only constraint the discretionary powers of the 
administrators and civil servants, but also bind the elected representatives, framewo
become instruments of the first to reduce the power of the latter (Pollit, 2006).  
More feasibility issues arise if we wonder how framework setting relates
k setting in which administrators and civil servants operate. Reasoning from a po
network perspective, one may expect that framework setting by representative bodies in 
network settings, as foreseen in the Dutch dualization policy, will not be without problem
Tensions exist between the demands made by the complexity, interdependencies and dynam
of horizontal implementation situations and the characteristics of framework setting as 
discussed above. We explain these tensions below.  
 
C
pluriformity of actors involved and the complicated nature of the set of issues they de
Knowledge is often dispersed over various actors within and outside government. Elected 
representatives have a hard time to cope with this complexity, due to their limited resource
With regard to the policy topics under discussion, it is just as difficult for them to take good 
implementation decisions as it is to take decisions about frameworks. Here, too, restrictions 
exist, such as lack of information, expertise and resources. A major problem is to distinguish
between ‘political’ meta decisions and administrative decisions. With a limited knowledge of 
a policy problem, how can you decide what the essentials of the policy are? In addition, 
laying down policy performance in frameworks has its disadvantages. Policy performanc
difficult to define and quantify. Quality is hard to capture in specified goals and quantitative 
indicators. Fixating on concrete aims may cause particular tasks to be neglected or prevent 
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requirements on the basis of their professionalism and their tacit knowledge (Johnson, 1991
Roe, 1994; Kelly, 1998; De Bruijn, 2007).  
 
Interdependencies. Administrators are strong
; 
ly dependent on other parties for the formation 
nd implementation of policy. Policy frameworks have to offer them a certain amount of 
 
y 
eriod insufficiently takes account 
f the fact that all kinds of developments may occur during the implementation process. 
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rk setting is not automatically effective in horizontal 
overnance. Its effectiveness will largely depend on the way representatives and 
he other 
hat 
Research Question and Research Strategy: Examining framework setting in the Dutch 
Province North Brabant  
 
In this article, we examine, in line ussed in section 2.1, aimed  at 
proving the coupling between vertical democracy and horizontal governance,  whether 
s 
 in 
principle, an instrument to 
control
 
his 
missioned a study into the conditions that a 
amework- setting policy white paper should meet, in order to enable the Provincial Council 
priate 
a
policy freedom to draft policy in co-production with these parties (compare Hjern and Porter,
1981; O’Toole, 1988; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981). The question is whether ex ante 
formulated frameworks offer the required discretionary freedom and flexibility for this (’t 
Hart, 2004). Furthermore, administrators run the risk of being held accountable for polic
outcomes, for which they are dependent on other parties.  
 
Dynamics. Laying down frameworks ex ante for a longer p
o
These may be market developments, emergence of new resources, new ideas, new political 
preferences or changes in the policies of higher governments (Kingdon, 1984; De Bruijn 
Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004). The static character of frameworks will 
inhibit administrators to be responsive to these developments. Furthermore, if actors involved 
in policy processes acknowledge these dynamics, static frameworks will easily become too 
rigid to be authoritative in debates.  
 
These tensions indicate that framewo
g
administrators deal with the tensions between framework setting on the one hand and the 
complexity, interdependencies and dynamic that mark horizontal governance on t
hand. In this contribution we therefore examine how actors deal with these tensions and w
we can learn from that regarding framework setting.   
 
 
with the third reaction disc
im
framework setting improves the coupling between horizontal governance and vertical politic
and how this relationship is influenced by the way the tensions between framework setting 
and the characteristics of horizontal governance are dealt with.  
This is an intriguing and relevant question, because framework setting as developed
the Dutch dualization policy, might also be seen as a hierarchical 
 network processes, aimed at restoring the primacy of politics (reaction 1). If so, we 
might indeed expect the tensions between framework setting and the characteristics of 
horizontal governance to become manifest. Whether framework setting will contribute to 
linking up vertical democracy with horizontal governance, in line with the ambitions of
reaction 3, will depend on the way representatives and administrators apply it in practice. T
arouses curiosity as to the policy practice.  
 
In 2005, the province of North Brabant com
fr
(PC) to steer and monitor adequately, while allowing the Provincial Executive the appro
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room to realize its executive tasks.3 Apparently, in provincial practice, it proved to be far 
from easy to work out the framework-setting role of the PC. This study allowed us to examine
our research question in the provincial policy practice 4
 
.   
                                                
We considered the provincial practice suited for this research, since the policy 
processes at the level of provinces are pre-eminently examples of horizontal governance and 
network management. This is due to the fact that provinces in the Netherlands are a 
government layer between national government and lower governments (municipalities and 
regional authorities) with many coordination tasks vis-à-vis other governments and with 
relatively few formal powers. Their functioning and performance is heavily dependent on the 
collaboration of other actors.  
 
We examined the practice of framework setting in policy networks by analyzing the 
content of six so-called ‘framework-setting policy white papers’ of the province of North 
Brabant, and the policy processes by which they were drafted, adopted and implemented. The 
policy networks consist of the actors participating in these procesess: members of the PE, 
civil servants, the staff of executive agencies, other governments, business, special interest 
groups, citizens, etcetera).  
We elaborated our general research question into the following more specific questions: 
 What did the framework of a framework-setting policy white paper exactly consist of? 
 What role did the PC play in developing, adopting and implementing these white 
papers?  
 To what extent were the tensions between framework setting on the one hand and the 
complexities, interdependencies and dynamics of the networks involved on the other 
hand manifest and how did that influence the quality of steering and monitoring by the 
PC? 
 What can be concluded from this analysis as regards the conditions that should be set 
on framework-setting white papers and the way framework setting is applied in 
network settings? 
 
The study into the provincial policy practice was conducted in four steps.  
The first step involved the selection of six framework-setting white papers to be 
studied. As stated in section 2.2, framework-setting white papers are an important instrument 
in the hands of the PC to realize its framework-setting role. Framework-setting white papers 
differ from other white papers and policy documents in that they outline the overall policy 
goals of the province regarding a certain policy area during a number of years (nevertheless, 
 
3 The Dutch provincial government constitutes a government layer in between the national government and 
lower governments. The Netherlands are divided into twelve provinces. The provincial government consists of a 
Provincial Council (PC) and the Provincial Executive (PE). The members of the PC are elected once every four 
years directly by the inhabitants of the province that are entitled to vote. They are member of political parties. A 
coalition of political parties that has the majority in the PC forms the PE. The governor of the Queen, who is 
appointed by central government, chairs the PE. The PE has an obligation to inform the PC about the contents of 
the policies. The PC has the power to enforce resignation of a PE-member by questioning their trust in this 
member. 
3 The ‘Steering with frameworks’ study (Koppenjan et al., 2006) was commissioned by the Policy Evaluation 
Commission of the Provincial Council of North Brabant and was conducted by staff of the Faculty of 
Technology, Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology from March until September 2006. 
 
4 The ‘Steering with frameworks’ study (Koppenjan et al., 2006) was commissioned by the Policy Evaluation 
Commission of the Provincial Council of North Brabant and was conducted by staff of the Faculty of 
Technology, Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology from March until September 2006. 
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for convenience, we’ll call them just ‘white papers’ from now on). Since the status of policy 
white papers is not always clear, we asked the office of the PC to list white papers that were 
considered by both PC and PE to be frame setting, given their significance for the policy area 
involved. From this list we have selected six white papers for in depth analysis. We have tried 
to make a representative selection by seeking variety in the period covered by the framework, 
the nature of policy areas involved, and the degree to which the province has autonomy in the 
respective policy areas.  Table 1 shows an overview of the selected white papers. 
 
Table 1. The six framework-setting white papers 
Memorandum Substance 
Dynamiek en Vernieuwing- De kracht van Brabant 
(“Dynamic and innovation – Brabant’s strength”). 
Framework Memorandum on Socio-economic Policy 
2002-2006. 5 February 2002. 
 
 
The memorandum presents the views of and efforts 
made in economic policy during the period from 2002 
to 2006. The memorandum’s mission is: ‘The 
sustainable strengthening of the competitiveness of the 
business community in an international perspective so 
as to promote the wealth and well-being of the people 
of Brabant and a sustainable development, also on a 
global level’ (p. 18). 
Reconstructie aan zet (“Reconstruction’s turn”). 
Umbrella memorandum on the Reconstruction of 
High-intensity Areas. 26 June 2001. 
 
 
The memorandum follows the “High-intensity areas 
(Reconstruction) Act”, enacted by the Lower House of 
Parliament in late 2000. This act was framed in 
response to the 1997 swine fever epidemic. 
Reconstructing of rural areas was believed to be a 
proper response. Reconstruction commissions were to 
draw up plans for each geographical area. The 
memorandum sets out what the province expects of 
these commissions in the next twelve years. 
Formulated aims relate to the situation that must have 
been reached not later than 10 years after the adoption 
of the plans.  
Cultuur in uitvoering (“Culture in progress”). Points of 
departure for the implementation of provincial cultural 
policy 2005-2008, 9 September 2003 
 
 
The memorandum outlines a framework for the 
implementation of the provincial cultural policy. The 
mission is: “To promote the broadest and most active 
participation possible of the residents of North Brabant 
in a diverse and high-quality cultural life in their 
province.” (p.5). 
Kadernota 2005 (“Framework Memorandum 2005”), 
April 2005. 
The Framework Memorandum is ‘the most important 
document in the dual planning and control cycle: the 
document on the basis of which the Provincial Council 
can make a comprehensive assessment of the policy 
proposals for the next few years’ (p. 3). The 
memorandum contains a set of proposals for the 
second half of the administrative period, 2005-2007.  
Meer Samen, Samen meer, Programma BrabantStad 
2004-2008 (“More together, together more. 
BrabantCity- Program 2004-2008”. 27 April 2004. 
The program is a joint memorandum of the Municipal 
Executives of the cities of Breda, Eindhoven, 
Helmond, ’s Hertogenbosch and Tilburg and the PE of 
the Province of North Brabant. The aim of the 
memorandum is ‘To achieve sustainable growth of the 
quality of life in the urban BrabantCity“BrabantStad” 
network in economic, spatial, social and cultural 
respects’ (p. 9).  
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Provinciaal Verkeer- en Vervoersplan; 
PVVP+.(“Provincial Traffic and Transport Plan; 
PTTP+”), 3 November 2006. 
The memorandum implements the national Transport 
Mobility Memorandum and the Spatial Planning 
Memorandum. The memorandum presents a vision of 
transport mobility in the province for the next 15 
years. Its point of departure is the ‘door-to-door’-
approach, meeting individual transport mobility needs 
of citizens and industry.  
 
 
Step two consisted of the analysis of the content of the white papers and the processes 
by which they were drafted, adopted and monitored during implementation. Besides doing a 
content analysis of the white papers involved, we studied related policy documents and we 
conducted a total of 18 interviews with Councilors, members of the PE, the staff of executive 
agencies and target groups.  
Step three was the organization of a validating workshop, in which 18 Councilors were 
given the opportunity to reflect on their steering and monitoring role during the process of 
development, adoption and implementation of white papers.  
Finally, in step four, we formulated recommendations for improving the way the PC 
sets frameworks and deals with these frameworks.  
In the next section the empirical findings of our study are presented: an overview of 
the practice of framework setting in the province of North Brabant.  
 
 
Framework setting in North Brabant:  findings 
 
Framework setting in North Brabant 
 
The practice of framework setting in the province of North Brabant illustrates the difficulties 
that the apparently simple principle of framework setting involves in practice. We will first 
discuss the content of the white papers, specifying the nature of the framework they comprise. 
Then the processes in which the frameworks were drafted, adopted and monitored during 
implementation will be addressed. 
 
The framework in the white paper. One of the premises behind framework setting is that the 
frameworks are guiding for the implementation, while they may also have a supporting role 
for the monitoring and adjusting by the PC. The frameworks studied provided that support, 
but only to a limited extent. We found a number of aspects compromising the potential of 
frameworks for these aims.  
 A first observation is that there was confusion in the provincial practice about what 
framework setting exactly means. First of all, there were differences in terminology. Dynamic 
and Innovation was a ‘framework white paper’, Reconstruction’s Turn was an ‘umbrella 
memorandum’, the BrabantCity Program was a ‘Program’ or ‘stimulation framework’ and 
Culture in Progress was called ‘points of departure for implementation’. It was not always 
clear where the terminologies originated from and whether they indicated differences between 
the frameworks. 
 There were also differences in form between the frameworks studied. Most frame-
setting white papers set out important substantive priorities and described what parties play an 
important role and how they are involved in the policy. Many white papers also contained an 
overview of the instruments with which the province can steer and the resources that can be 
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allocated for it. Differences existed particularly in the way the process of monitoring and 
adjusting by the PC is organized. Such a process has been set out in only two cases 
(Reconstruction’s Turn and PTTP+). The other four white papers did not contain any 
information about the role of the Provincial Council.  
 Furthermore, most white papers appeared to have multiple functions, apart from being 
a steering and monitoring instrument for the PC. They may also have had an information 
function for both PC and PE, integrating present and future policies in a policy area. They 
often had a more external function too. Some frameworks have rather been developed for 
steering and monitoring of implementing bodies and target groups by the PE.  
A final conclusion from the analysis is that, although most frameworks contained long 
lists of points of departure, goals, instruments, resources and projects, they rarely contained 
quantitative statements about goal achievement. Goals and performance were hardly specified 
or quantified. In so far as policy indicators have been included, no standard was provided for 
them, for example in the form of an output obligation. The white papers thus offered many 
data, but hardly provided support for the specific fulfillment of the PC’s monitoring, steering 
and adjusting role. 
 
Agenda-setting and the preparation process of the framework. Since the PC aims to use white 
papers as instrument to shape its framework-setting role in the policy process, one would 
expect the PC to take the lead and to be actively involved in the preparation of these policy 
documents. In practice almost all white papers have been prepared predominantly at civil-
service level. In some cases the PC did play a significant role in these process phases. As 
regards Reconstruction’s Turn, the PC broadened the agenda together with municipalities 
concerned, supplementing the technical subjects mentioned in the drafts of the white paper 
with socio-economic issues. This intervention determined the reconstruction process and its 
outcomes to a great extent. For the Framework Memorandum 2005, the PC itself drew up the 
agenda, after which civil servants elaborated the proposed subjects.  
In the other frameworks under study, the PC, however, played a rather modest role. The 
framework- setting part of PTTP+ is presented as ‘from the PC’, but not all respondents 
recognized a difference between that part and another part, written by civil servants. The other 
four frameworks were both initiated and prepared by civil servants. The PC joined the process 
just before the framework was adopted.  
 During the workshop, Councilors pointed out that they play a reactive rather than a 
pro-active role in the drafting of policy white papers and therefore hardly have any steering 
influence. They find it difficult to keep track of the various policy processes and the various 
documents that policy processes generate. Councilors simply lack the time to familiarize 
themselves with the complex subject matter. The frameworks have already been developed to 
a very advanced stage before the PC can study them. This gives Councilors the impression 
that many documents catch the PC unawares. During the workshop, there proved to be 
confusion about the status of white papers and the place of the white papers in the policy 
process. Councilors thus lack insight into the steering and monitoring moments available to 
them. This is especially so if a white paper cuts across several policy sectors, as was the case 
in the BrabantCity- Program and Reconstruction’s Turn..  
 A frequently heard complaint concerned ‘information overload’. Councilors work 
part-time and so have limited time and resources to handle information. This information, 
however, is produced by a civil service consisting of many full-time employees. Moreover, 
different dossiers often show direct and indirect linkages with each other, suggesting that 
councilors shouldn’t limit themselves to read information strictly addressed to their own 
dossiers. 
 Finally, it appeared during the workshop that there is little system in the contacts with 
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citizens. As regards many cases, such as Culture in Progress and Dynamic and Innovation, it 
was found that Councilors have few contacts with executive organizations, target groups and 
citizens, although these actors do interact intensively with civil servants and administrators. 
This led to the question from a Councilor in the workshop what the PC can actually still add 
to a framework that is developed in close interaction between the Executive and other 
provincial actors. 
 
The adoption of the framework. The PC occasionally played an important role in the decision 
making on the white papers. We mention two examples of steering in this policy phase: 
 The PC did not adopt the white paper Culture in Progress, developed at civil-service 
level, until a forthcoming change of administration. This enabled the PC to discuss the 
content for the next administrative period and get the results of that discussion 
incorporated in the coalition agreement of the PE for this upcoming period. This 
guaranteed administrative ‘commitment’ to a number of subjects the PC considered to be 
important. Besides, a specific subject that was considered important at the time could be 
included in the framework.  
 The PC adopted the Dynamic and Innovation white paper without committing itself to the 
extra expenditure it requested. During the debate in the Council meeting on the white 
paper, it was suggested that the decision on this expenditure  should be postponed to the 
debate about the program budget and the annual accounts. The Councilors wanted a 
substantive debate about the policy, apart from the money. Moreover, they did not want 
the integral decision making on provincial funds in the context of the Planning and 
Control cycle to be constrained  by earlier financial pledges. 
 
In the other cases the white papers at issue were strongly debated, but this rarely led to 
substantial amendments. As far as motions and amendments were tabled, according to our 
respondents they had hardly any steering effect. This picture is confirmed by the cases 
involving the BrabantCity5 partnership. There was much debate about the vagueness of the 
role of the PC and the province in BrabantCity. However, eventually no solution was found 
and the framework was adopted. During the workshop, it emerged that the PC occasionally 
interfered with details rather than essentials of a policy problem or solution. The cause was 
believed to be the PC’s difficulty to have an overall view of the policy. The information 
overload was also mentioned in this context. White papers were said to be already shaped in 
detail before the PC gave its comments. At that point most of the important subjects had 
already been decided upon.  
 
The implementation of the framework. During the implementation of  Reconstruction’s Turn 
the PC played an important moderating role in monitoring. This white paper set out a process 
in which spatial reconstruction commissions (comprising stakeholders from the field) had to 
submit substantive reconstruction proposals within provincial frameworks. The PC played a 
role in the composition of the commissions, in solving a conflict with an interest group within 
the commissions and in dealing with differences between the framework and the 
commissions’ recommendations. The PC also held a substantive debate about the tension 
between the commissions’ proposals for land use and ‘vulnerable provincial interests’.  
In the other dossiers, however, the monitoring role of the PC appeared to be limited. In 
as far as agreements were included in frameworks about information supply to the PC, for 
                                                 
5 “BrabantCity” is a partnership between the province and five big cities in the province of Brabant. This 
partnership plays a role in several framework setting white papers, including, of course, the “BrabantCity” 
Program’ we studied. 
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example in the form of a section about monitoring, these were not always put into practice 
during the implementation. In the Culture in Progress file, the PC demanded implementation 
Programs. In the white paper, twelve of such Programs were announced. Only two have 
actually been issued. The question is whether the PC would then hold the PE to the 
agreement. In many instances, political rationality prevents the PC from doing so. Loyalty of 
the large political parties within the PC to the governing coalition may overrule the interest of 
a firm stand of the PC as an institution.  
Besides this political rationale, other factors are at play. In the case of Culture in 
Progress, respondents said they did not remember the pledge of the implementation 
Programs. Evidently, not all Councilors had sufficient insight into the overall process in 
which a framework had been drafted, adopted and implemented. For example, not everybody 
knew whether any pledges were made during earlier policy phases, what they were and 
whether pledges were honored. In many cases, they referred to the Registry as a suitable actor 
to deal with this lack of institutional memory. However, the Registry has only limited 
resources. 
 Finally, in all cases studied, the PC was faced with a lack of insight into the extent of 
goal achievement. The respondents mentioned several causes: 
 Complexity (Reconstruction’s Turn) 
 High abstraction level of the framework (Dynamic and Innovation; Culture in Progress) 
 Vagueness about the role of the PC (BrabantCity-Program) 
 Too many indicators, without specified target values and norms (PTTP+) 
 A lack of reference to the performance of the preceding year (Framework Memorandum 
2005) 
 
Remarkably, in the case of Dynamic and Innovation a deliberate choice was made to 
formulate activities rather than measurable indicators. The reason was that the Executive 
refused to commit itself to measurable indicators, because too many external factors would 
influence policy outcomes. A score on measurable indicators would therefore not 
automatically indicate performance. The formulated activities, however, proved to offer 
insufficient possibilities for the PC to check whether aims had been achieved.  
 
Analysis: The relation with complexity, interdependence and dynamics  
 
In recent years, the PC of the province of North Brabant has been looking for a format for its 
framework-setting role and a way of using framework-setting policy white papers as an 
instrument in the process. This proved to be a laborious search and the framework-setting role 
has not taken full shape yet, as shown here in this North Brabant case study. But why is it so 
difficult? We suggest this is due to the tensions between the nature of framework setting and 
the characteristics of horizontal policy networks in which policies are developed and 
implemented. In this section we confront the empirical material we found with the three 
theoretical tensions between framework setting and policy networks: 
 
Framework setting and complexity.  
 Because of complexity, Councilors had no influence on listing white papers on the agenda 
and developing them. Policy white papers were prepared at civil-service level on the 
initiative of the Provincial Executive  It was therefore hard for Councilors to gain insight 
into the preparation of the framework and have steering influence on this development 
process. This resulted in an information disadvantage at an early stage.  
 Complexity caused Councilors to have difficulty in formulating frameworks. Since 
Councilors were only involved in the development process to a very limited extent, they 
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 Complexity led to a limited insight into steering and monitoring moments. The analysis 
showed that policy white papers were not isolated documents, but that they were 
interrelated with other documents, frameworks and processes. For example, the three 
white papers PTTP+, Dynamic and Innovation and BrabantCity frequently referred to 
each other. This made the process of steering and monitoring an intricate one. What does 
adopting one framework imply for other frameworks? What frameworks are relevant to 
concrete issues? What framework should have priority? The PC only had a limited insight 
into the steering and monitoring moments available to it. Besides, there was confusion 
about what frameworks and framework-setting white papers actually were.   
 
Framework setting and interdependencies. 
 Interdependencies gave Councilors a disadvantage. Many of the policy white papers were 
developed in close interaction between civil servants and the PE on the one hand and the 
field on the other hand. Councilors had far less contact with stakeholder organizations, 
and had so more incidentally. This also strengthened the Councilors’ information 
disadvantage. Besides, the involvement of the field had a strongly legitimizing function. 
During the workshop, Councilors wondered aloud what the PC in its representative role 
could add.  
 Interdependencies led to vague frameworks. The frameworks in the white papers we 
studied were rather abstract and vague and left the PE considerable latitude. Although 
some white papers, such as the PTTP+, contained performance indicators, they did not 
contain norms. As we mentioned in section 3.1, the Dynamic and Innovation white paper 
explicitly opted for the formulation of activities rather than measurable success indicators. 
The reason was that civil servants and the Provincial Executive felt that external factors 
influenced performance. It seemed unwise for the Provincial Executive to commit itself to 
results over which it had no control.  
 
Framework setting and dynamics. 
 Because of dynamics, frameworks did not always succeed in arranging the relation 
between the PC and the PE. Many white papers paid little attention to the relation between 
the PC and the PE. This function of framework setting in practice often seems not to have 
been leading. The frameworks presented in the white papers fulfilled different functions. 
Some gave an overview of the policy field and the issues at stake (Culture in Progress), 
some were intended to give the policy a new impulse (Reconstruction’s Turn), and some 
legitimized policy proposals towards the national government (BrabantCity). By 
presenting frameworks, the province reacted to the dynamics in the arena surrounding 
provincial and national policy. However, in many cases this was not the function of 
framework setting as envisaged in the dualistic system.  
 Dynamics eroded the relevance of the framework for implementation and monitoring. For 
instance, during the implementation of the Culture in Progress white paper, it appeared 
that both implementers and Councilors monitoring the policy had more or less forgotten 
the content of the white paper after some time. The PC can set requirements on the 
implementation in white papers, but, evidently, these requirements may lose relevance or 
authoritativeness in the course of time because of changing circumstances. 
 
Conclusion: why framework setting did not result in an adequate coupling 
 
Our findings suggest that the present way of dealing with framework setting leads to a non-
 13
binding coupling between vertical politics and horizontal governance. In fact, the relation 
between the PC and the PE has hardly been arranged. Examples of this are fatalist attitudes 
(‘no news is good news’ about BrabantCity), a lack of institutional memory necessary to 
confront administrators with pledges made (as was the case for Culture in Progress) and a 
decoupling of the financial from the substantial debate about a framework (Dynamic and 
Innovation), which made the latter debate relatively free of obligations. At some occasions the 
PC succeeded in steering and monitoring the policy process more effectively. This happened 
for instance when they postponed the adoption of Culture in Progress. Especially in the 
Reconstruction’s Turn- process, the PC succeeded in taking up a constructive role in staffing 
commissions for operational decision making, mediating between provincial actors and 
considering ‘provincial values’ in a debate after reconstruction plans had been made. These 
actions and interventions have in common that administrators have been left plenty room to 
maneuver in horizontal networks. None of the actions imply tight frameworks formulated 
upfront. Still they have had major impact on the outcomes of the public debates. 
However, these examples are exceptions. Our findings suggest that usually the PC did not 
succeed in playing a framework-setting role in provincial policies. It had major problems in 
taking part in and influencing processes of developing, adopting and implementing 
frameworks. The PC has not yet developed a clear method for setting frameworks and did not 
succeed in systematically fulfilling a steering or monitoring role.  
A possible policy recommendation might be that framework setting as envisaged in 
the dual system should be applied far more strictly and consistently. But such advice would 
ignore our analysis of the tensions between the characteristics of horizontal governance and 
framework setting. It is precisely the complexity, the interdependencies and the dynamics of 
horizontal governance that hamper the setting of frameworks or that make frameworks 
obsolete soon. The observations regarding the absence of tightly formulated frameworks in 
successful attempts of the PC to influence the policy process, also point in this direction.   
So it seems that horizontal networks impede framework setting to be effective if the 
coupling is arranged like originally foreseen in the dualization policy. For answering the 
question how this coupling can be arranged so, that the network characteristics are dealt with 
more adequately, further reflection on the phenomenon of framework setting is needed. 
 
 
Discussion: rethinking framework setting  
 
In this section we discuss the implications of our findings for framework setting in policy 
networks. First we discuss how framework setting might take the complexities, 
interdependencies and dynamics of networks into account. Next we outline how this type of 
framework setting would differ from the approach used in the dualization policy. In section 
4.3 we show what these thoughts might mean in practice, by presenting our recommendations 
to the PC of North Brabant. 
 
Aligning framework setting and policy networks 
 
Building on the theoretical considerations of section 2 and the findings in section 3, we 
suggest that aligning framework setting with the characteristics of the networks in which 
policies are developed and implemented, implies dealing with the following issues:  
 
Complexity: Dealing with asymmetry in knowledge and information. The problem of the 
knowledge disadvantage of the representative body compared to other parties should be dealt 
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with. However, the solution of the framework-setting model of the dualization approach, 
focusing on ‘political meta-decisions’, is not very satisfactory.  In practice it is hard to make 
distinctions between administrative and political decisions, especially if representatives have 
limited information on the policy (Przeworski et al., 1999). If policy frameworks are prepared 
by actors in the policy network, the possibilities of representatives to actually take meta-
decisions are limited.  Moreover, what the meta-decisions regarding a policy are, is not an 
objective fact, but depends on political judgment. In other words, if representative bodies 
want to have influence, an early and continuous dialogue is needed between representatives 
and administrators, in which the first are informed and can determine what they see as the 
essentials of the policy under discussion.  
 In doing so, representatives should be prudent regarding the conditions under which 
they participate in interaction processes with network actors. They should be clear about the 
role they perform, given their  frame-setting task. In this way they prevent wrong expectations 
of other actors, regarding the possibilities to negotiate outcomes with representatives directly, 
bypassing the democratic process. Analogous to Jasanoff’s proposal to safeguard the impartial 
position of researchers in the interaction between policy research and policy process, 
‘boundary work’ is required here: arranging interaction moments, with the boundaries 
between the two domains marked in a way that is clearly recognizable for those involved on 
the basis of mutually agreed upon and explicit rules and roles that specify different 
responsibilities and positions of both parties (Jasanoff, 1994). 
 
Interdependencies: Creating conditions for commitment and learning. Framework setting 
according to the Dutch dualization resulted in a lack of commitment, since the parties feared 
to be held responsible for policy outcomes, for which they were dependable upon others. 
Since the process by which members of the Executive were held accountable was not 
arranged, conditions for commitment and learning were unfavorable (Broadbent et al., 1996; 
Behn, 2001). If we want to enhance these conditions, the process of holding actors 
accountable for performance should be organized in such a way that the policy framework is 
not applied rigidly or at will. We suggest that actors agree upon a loose coupling between 
performance and implications: thus creating room for debates between representatives and 
administrators to evaluate outcomes and their causes, and to develop sensible courses of 
action to deal with deviations of expectations. Tight couplings, which imply that deviations of 
earlier formulated performance are per definition failures, exclude debate, eliminate learning 
and result in blame games (De Bruijn, 2007; Hood, 2002).   
 
Dynamics: Dynamizing the process of framework setting. Frameworks should be able to cope 
with changing circumstances under which policy is drafted and implemented. The framework 
should be reviewed regularly. The idea that the fate of a policy is determined by crucial 
‘political meta-decisions’ taken at one specific point in time, as the framework setting 
approach of the Dutch dualization policy seems to suggest,  is a far too simplistic view on 
complex policy processes. Complex interaction processes consist of a series of decisions by 
which parties gradually develop policy as they go along (Lindblom, 1979; Kingdon, 1984; 
Teisman and Klijn, 2008). Policy processes are continuous learning processes, in which 
crucial political decisions continuously present themselves (Roe, 1994; Van Kersbergen and 
van Waarden, 2004). This insight has drastic consequences for framework setting. There is a 
need for a more dynamic way of framework setting.  
 
The outlines of framework setting in network conditions 
 
Building on the considerations in section 4.1, in this section we will outline the characteristics 
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of a framework-setting approach that meets the conditions of network settings. We will do 
this by contrasting this approach with that of the approach suggested in the Dutch dualization 
policy, which can be characterized as ‘ex ante framework setting’. 
 Ex ante framework setting presupposes a sequential coupling between framework 
setting and policy process. Frameworks are set beforehand. Policy outcomes are compared 
with ex ante formulated frameworks, followed by adjustment, if required. Actually, this type 
of framework setting is aimed at trying to control the process of horizontal governance. Since 
this does not reflect the actual power relations as existing in the real world, it is no wonder 
this type of framework setting fails. 
 If framework setting is aimed at connecting the activities of representative bodies with 
those of the parties in network settings, we suggest viewing framework setting and policy 
process as two parallel processes, as visualized in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. The process of dynamic framework setting 
 
 
The process of drafting and implementing consists of a series of decisions, a series of policy 
rounds. During this process, couplings should be made with the political debate conducted or 
led by the representative body. These couplings imply that representatives are fed by 
information, proposals and reports from the policy arena at agreed times. In this way the 
information backlog of representatives is reduced, enabling them to take strategic decisions. 
In their turn, they take guiding decisions at such times, which are frame-setting for the 
behavior of administrators in following rounds of interaction in the policy process. Therefore, 
there is continuous interaction in which political and policy process are mutually adjusted.  
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of this way of frame-setting, by contrasting it 
with ex ante framework setting. 
 
Table 2. Two approaches to framework setting 
Ex ante framework setting Framework setting in a horizontal policy 
network 
At a certain point in time ‘meta-decisions’ are taken that 
determines policy.  
In policy processes, crucial decisions are taken 
continuously. 
It is possible to distinguish between businesslike 
administrative decisions and political ‘meta- decisions’. 
It is hard to determine what political ‘meta-decisions’ are. 
 16
Framework setting aims to reduce the information 
disadvantage of the representative body as far as this is 
necessary for taking meta-decisions.  
Framework setting aims to improve the information 
position of representative bodies regarding the policy 
network during the whole of the process, in line with the 
limited resources that the representative body has 
available. 
Steering happens beforehand and monitoring and 
adjusting afterwards. 
Steering, monitoring and adjusting are ongoing, 
alternating activities.  
Unilateral principal-agent relation aimed at controlling 
the policy process. 
Dialogue and mutual learning, recognizing each other’s 
specific roles (boundary work). 
Contains an assignment for the executive body about both 
the policy substance (policy problems, performance) and 
the policy process (the way the interaction with parties 
concerned is shaped).  
Contains agreements with the executive body about both 
the policy substance and the policy process, including 
provisions for the interaction with the representative 
body. 
Static: The framework is a fixed, long-time point of 
reference.  
Dynamic: The framework is adapted continuously (but 
not unconditionally) in interaction with other parties. 
 
Since framework setting has to be realized in network settings, it can not simply be imposed 
by representative bodies. They have to negotiate this new division of roles and the rules that 
come with it with the Executive. Since both parties have a common interest in improving the 
coupling between horizontal governance and vertical politics, in principle it should be 
possible to arrive at an agreement, although in practice this may prove to be difficult or even 
impossible. Obviously, the content of framework setting in concrete settings can not be 
standardized. The characteristics of framework setting we have outlined here are merely 
general principles to be kept in mind by practitioners, involved in attempts at realizing it.  
In order to arrive at such a way of framework setting, it is necessary for representative bodies 
and administrators to internalize these principles. 
 
Recommendations for the implementation of dynamic framework setting in North Brabant 
 
How might the above suggested ideas be applied in practice? In this section we present the 
outlines of our advice to the Provincial Council of North Brabant, in order to give an 
impression.  
 Identify interaction moments. Make an agreement with the PE on how intentions to draw 
up framework-setting memorandums will be placed on the agenda. Informing the PC at an 
early stage of the administration’s intentions to issue memorandums will prevent the PC 
from being caught by surprise by all kinds of initiatives.  
 Specify the nature and content of policy frames. Make an agreement with the PE on what 
requirements framework-setting memorandums have to satisfy. These requirements 
concern the substance of the policy, the way the policy is implemented and the way the 
PE accounts for the policy to the PC. 
 Arrange the process of agenda-setting and policy formation. Agree with the PE that an 
initial memorandum will be issued prior to the framing of a framework-setting policy 
memorandum. This is a short document setting out the problem as well as the use of, and 
the need for, the policy. It enables the PC to inform itself in good time and express an 
opinion about the substance of the policy memorandum and the way it will be realized.  
 Arrange the process by which the implementation of the framework is assessed. Make 
agreements with the Provincial Executive on how, when and in what respects it will 
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 Decide upon assessing the practice of framework setting after two years. As PC, lay down 
the method to be used in framework setting and decide to evaluate this method after 
approximately two years, because recommendations about other methods will easily 
remain “paper” (compare O’Toole, 1988).  
 Organize self-reflection. Make provisions for moments of reflection at which Councilors 
contemplate and discuss their new role fulfillment and the appropriate behavior and 
methods. After all, the ideas about new ways of framework setting will only take root if 
parties have internalized them, especially because learning experiences regarding 
framework-setting processes are interrupted by the change of Councilors following 
elections if no attempts are made to transfer these experiences to newcomers.  
 
Although these proposals for dynamic framework setting imply a radically different way of 
interaction between Councilors and the Provincial Executive, they do not require 
revolutionary organizational changes. In the case of the province of North Brabant, numerous 
provisions for steering and monitoring are already in place. A political-administrative agenda 
is used by the Council to influence the agenda of the province, framework-setting policy 
white papers are being drafted and used, a planning and control cycle with a Program budget 
and an annual report exists, progress reports and evaluations are brought out, etc. What is 
needed is a new practice in which these instruments are used consciously and systematically 
to bring about the type of framework setting we propose.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have concluded on the basis of an empiric analysis that ex ante framework 
setting as defined in the Dutch dualization policy does not contribute to an improved coupling 
between the vertical institutions of the representative democracy and the practice of horizontal 
governance. In order for framework setting to do so, it should be aligned with the 
characteristics of governance in network settings. In the last part of the contribution we 
outlined the characteristics of such a type of framework setting and made some suggestions 
regarding its application in practice. Even though they build on findings derived from a Dutch 
case study, both the case study as well as our reflection were guided by more general 
theoretical notions. Therefore we think that our ideas on framework setting have a more 
generic significance that goes beyond the Dutch context. If used prudently, they may help 
politicians and administrators to reflect on and improve their relationship. The question 
whether these ideas hold needs to be answered by further systematical testing, both in practice 
and by empirical research.  
 We realize that attempts to couple vertical politics and horizontal governance are 
always vulnerable. The electoral cycle, for instance, a quintessential feature of representative 
democracy, is an inherent disruption of joint learning experiences regarding the division of 
roles between representatives and administration. Furthermore, our proposals are at odds with 
the dominant political culture, which holds incentives for politicians not to have themselves 
disciplined by agreements with each other and with implementers, and instead cherish the 
illusion of political primacy.  
 Although our thoughts on framework setting do not completely solve these problems, 
they may contribute to the improvement of the coupling between vertical politics and 
horizontal governance, which to our opinion  is essential for both the vitality and relevance of 
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the institutions of the representative democracy and the democratic quality of horizontal 
governance. 
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